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We provide a security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with
discrete modulation against general attacks in a realistic finite-size regime. To realize this goal,
we first prove security of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol with discrete
modulation against collective attacks by using the reliable tomography of the covariance matrix,
leading to the reliable and tight error bounds in the derived confidence regions. Combining the
proof with de Finetti reduction, the discrete-modulation-based continuous-variable quantum key
distribution (DM-CVQKD) is proved to be secure even exposing to general attacks. Specially, we
use an energy test to truncate the Hilbert space globally to provide security.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant
parties, Alice and Bob, who have access to an authenti-
cated classical channel to share secret keys even in the
presence of an eavesdropper [1]. The traditional QKD
protocols can be divided into two families, the discrete-
variable (DV) QKD [2] that based on photon counting
techniques and continuous-variable (CV) QKD which re-
lying on detections. CVQKD, which has stable reliable
light resource and high detection efficiency, may be prac-
tically compatible with classical optical communication
over DVQKD [3]. Unfortunately, despite all these advan-
tages, CVQKD is still not considered as a true alternative
to DVQKD because of the short secure distance [4]. Dif-
ferent from DVQKD, the task of classical post-processing
for Alice and Bob extracting a key from continuous ran-
dom values is more complicated and the post-processing
efficiency is also achieving its limit [5]. For example, an
initial CVQKD protocol using discrete modulation (DM)
was proposed to realize the task of distributing secret
keys over long distance as well as simplifying both the
modulation scheme and the key extraction process [6, 7].
Currently, proving the security of QKD against gen-
eral attacks in a realistic finite-size regime has become
an open problem in the theoretical quantum cryptogra-
phy [8]. For DVQKD protocol, composable security [9]
was established for some classical protocols i.e. BB84
protocol [10]. The finite-key analyses based on the
uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [11] and the
large deviation theory [12] were also suggested. As for
CVQKD counterpart, a composable security proof [13–
15] of squeezed states was achieved from an entropic un-
certainty principle [16]. Recently, the composable se-
curity proof of CVQKD with coherent states has been
demonstrated [17]. Based on Gaussian de Finetti reduc-
tion, which exploits the invariance of CV protocols un-
der the action of unitary group U(n) and the generalized
SU(2, 2) coherent states, the security of CVQKD with co-
herent states against general attacks was proved [18]. Up
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to now, the finite-size effects of the DM-CVQKD protocol
have only been considered on the parameter estimation
(PE) procedure [19], however the security against general
attacks is still far from being completely understood.
In this work, we present the security proof of the DM-
CVQKD with reverse reconciliation (RR) valid against
general attacks. The contributions of this work are
twofold. In contrast to existing finite-size effects on PE
of the DM-CVQKD, we provide, for the first time, the
composable security proof against collective attacks in
finite-key regime. Moreover, we apply the de Finetti re-
duction to obtain the security against general attacks on
the basis of the former. The first procedure involves the
reliable tomography of the covariance matrix and error
correction (EC), and the latter exploits the invariance
of CV protocols under the actions of the unitary group,
leading to the generalized coherent states. Besides, trun-
cating the total Hilbert space to a finite-dimensional one
with an energy test is also necessary to implement de
Finetti reduction. Since the four-state protocol outper-
forms other DM-CVQKD protocols, we consider the case
of the former in what follows.
Security Definition.—In the DM-CVQKD protocol,
the state can be expressed in Fock state [20]. We take
four-state modulation for example,
|φk〉 = e
−
|α|2
2√
λk
∑∞
n=0
α4n+4√
(4n+k)!
|4n+ k〉. (1)
The resulting DM-CVQKD system is a canonical infinite
dimensional quantum system composed of an ensemble
of 4N modes described by a Hilbert space.
To prove the security of the protocol, we follow the
definition in ref. [21]. A list of properties ideal we expect
the protocol to achieve is first given, and then the secu-
rity of the real protocol is defined by indistinguishability
from the ideal case. Normally, we call these properties
secrecy, correctness and robustness. The protocol will be
considered as robust if it outputs nontrivial keys when
the adversary is passive which means the adversary does
not disturb quantum communications. We consider the
strongest type of security by exposing the protocol to
2general attacks, where an adversary may tamper with
the arbitrary signals exchanged between Alice and Bob
over quantum channels [22]. The classical channel can be
monitored by the adversary. In this work, we first prove
the security of the DM-CVQKD protocol against collec-
tive, and then reduce the general attacks to the collective
one with de Finetti reduction.
A protocol is called correct, if the outputs of the pro-
tocol on Alice and Bob’s side are identical. It is called
ǫcor-correct if it is ǫcor-indistinguishable from a correct
protocol. Particularly, we have Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor [11].
A protocol is called secrecy if the protocol produces a key
S which is uniformly distributed and independent of the
states of the system E held by the adversary. A key is
called ǫ-secret from E if it is ǫ-close to a uniformly dis-
tributed key that is uncorrelated with the adversary [23],
that is
min
ρE
1
2
‖ρSE − ωS ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, (2)
where ωS is the completely mixed states on S. A protocol
is called secret, if, for any attacks strategy, ǫ = 0 when-
ever the protocol outputs a key. It is called ǫsec-secret,
if its output key is ǫ-secret with (1 − pabort)ǫ ≤ ǫsec,
where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts.
This probability depends on the strategy of the adver-
sary, which is on the input state ΨABE. Indeed, the ad-
versary can always choose to cut the line between Alice
and Bob and hence make sure that the protocol always
aborts. This is fine since the key will nevertheless be
secure. Another important parameter is the robustness,
ǫrob, which corresponds to the abort probability when the
adversary is passive, and if the characteristics of quan-
tum channels are conform to what was expected. For
instance, in the case of the DM-CVQKD, a typical quan-
tum channel can be characterized by its transmittance T
and excess noise ξ. A protocol is ǫ-secure if it is ǫsec-secret
and ǫcor-correct with ǫsec + ǫcor ≤ ǫ.
An operational way of quantifying the security is by
bounding the diamond distance between two completely
positive trace-preserving (CPTP) maps E and F , where E
denotes the practical DM-CVQKD protocol and F is an
ideal version of the same protocol. The ideal version can
be achieved by concatenating E and a (virtual) protocol
P that replaces the final keys SA and SB by a perfect key
S. We define F = P ◦ E and the protocol E is ǫ-secure if
1
2‖E −F‖⋄ ≤ ǫ, which will be detailedly discussed in the
de Finetti reduction part.
Protocol Definition.—As shown in Table I, Alice pre-
pares a string four-dimensional vectors, which are picked
from one of the three distributions: discrete modulation
states (2n random variables used for key distillation), de-
coy states (2m make the mixture of these states indistin-
guishable from a Gaussian state) and Gaussian states (2k
used for parameter estimation). Alice sends these states
through a linear quantum channel to Bob, who performs
heterodyne detection. Alice and Bob use a reverse rec-
onciliation and the sign of measurement result to encode
the raw key bit. Bob also sends some side information
to Alice (syndrome of U for a error correcting code C
Table I. The DM-CV QKD protocol.
State Preparation:—Alice chooses one of the three distri-
butions: discrete modulation states, decoy states (discarded
at the end of the protocol) and Gaussian states each time.
Alice randomly draws a random orthogonal transformation R
from the orthogonal group and computes vector x′ = Rx wh-
ich will be used for state modulation.
Distribution:—Alice sends these states to Bob over a linear
channels, which can be modeled by a transmission T and a
excess noise ξ.
Measurement:—Bob measure their modes with heterodyne
detection and obtains a vector y′. Alice describes R to Bob
and Bob applies R′ to his vector y′ and obtains y = R−1y′.
Data Classification:—Alice reveals which data should be
kept for key distillation, which one should be discarded
(decoy states) and which one should be used for parameter
estimation (Gaussian states).
Error Correction:—Bob sends side information to Alice
over classical channels, typically the syndrome U of his string
relative to a binary code they agree on beforehand. Alice out-
puts a guess UA for the string of Bob. Bob computes a hash
of U with length ⌈log
1/ǫcor
⌉ and sends it to Alice compares it
with its own hash. If both hashes coincide, the protocol resu-
mes, otherwise it aborts. The value leakEC corresponds to the
total number of bits sent by Bob during the EC phase.
Parameter Estimation:—Bob sends nPE bits of information
to Alice that allow her to calculate {γa, γb, γc}. If γa ≤ Σ
max
a ,
γb ≤ Σ
max
b and γc ≥ Σ
min
c , then the protocol continues. Other-
wise it will be aborted.
Privacy Amplification:—Alice and Bob apply a random
universal2 hash function to their respective strings, resulting
in two strings SA and SB of size l.
agreed on in advance), and Alice compares its own gauss
Uˆ with Bob’s string. The comparison results in whether
the protocol is kept or aborted. Alice and Bob divide
Gaussian state X and Y into two parts, {X1, X2} and
{Y1, Y2}, respectively. Then they use X1 and Y1 to give
the confidence region for X2 and Y2, or vice versa. The
key will not be kept except the data falls within the con-
fidence interval. Finally, Alice and Bob adopt privacy
amplification to increase the secrecy of the raw key.
Analysis for Collective Attacks.—We present the main
results, quantifying the security of the protocol E against
Gaussian collective attacks. The output of the DM-
CVQKD protocol is nontrivial when the adversary is
passive. Besides, It is both ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secret
against collective attacks, given that the length l of the
secret SA is selected approximately for a given set of ob-
served values. The correctness of the protocol is guaran-
teed by its error correction step. The hash U used for
EC has a length of ⌈log2 1ǫcor ⌉, which restricts the error
probability Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor. The PE procedure gives
3the confidence regions of the covariance matrix.
Theorem 1. The protocol is ǫ-secret against collective
attacks if ǫ = ǫPE + ǫcor + ǫent + ǫsm and the length l of
bit string S, which forms the secret key SA, satisfies the
constraint
l ≤ 2n[2HˆMLE(U)− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )]
−leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent,
(3)
where HˆMLE(U) denotes the empiric entropy of U ,
leakEC = ⌈log2 1ǫcor ⌉ corresponds to the total number
of bits sent by Bob during the error correction phase,
∆AEP :=
√
n(16 + log 2ǫ2 + 8
√
log 2ǫ2 ) + 4
ǫ
p + log
2
p2 ,
∆ent := n logn
√
2 log 2ǫent and f is the function com-
puting the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s
measurement result for a Gaussian state with covariance
matrix parametrized by Σmaxa , Σ
max
b and Σ
min
c .
In security analysis of collective attacks, we consider
parameter estimation (PE). As explained previously, the
aims of the PE processing are to give a confidence re-
gion of the covariance matrix and sift out the data the
pass the test. We follow the quantum state tomography
in Ref. [24] and take quantum tomography as a process
symmetrizing the 2k systems and making a prediction of
the remaining k systems with the measurement results
of the first k systems. The balance between failure prob-
ability of prediction and size of the confidence interval
need to be kept while smaller confidence interval means
larger error probability but higher secret key rate.
A problem concerning the tomography of DM system
comes up that the covariance matrix is priori unbounded.
The solution to this problem lies in approximately sym-
metrizing the state ρ2k before measuring k subsystems
and inferring properties for the remaining k systems. We
briefly introduce the tomography of the input state ρ2k
of the DM-CVQKD protocol in three steps:
(1) Active symmetrization.—Choose a subset F of the
orthogonal group and for Alice and Bob, apply the
same element f ∈ F to their 2(n+m+k) modes, out-
putting a new state ρ˜2(n+m+k). This operation can
also be implemented by applying the same element
to their data before postprocessing.
(2) Distribution and measurement.—Alice and Bob clas-
sify the states to three types and use the Gaussian
states for tomography. They distribute ρ˜k1 to A1 and
B1. Similarly, the remaining states ρ˜
k
2 are given to
A2 and B2. The parties measure their own data
with heterodyne detection. A1 and B1 yield X1
and Y1 while A2 and B2 obtain X2 and Y2, where
X1, Y1, X2, Y2 ∈ R2n.
(3) Parameter estimation.—B1 sends some information
to A1 through side channel to help her learn the
‖X1‖2, ‖Y1‖2 and 〈X1, Y1〉. After that A1 will derive
a confidence interval for ρ˜2. Analogously, A2 could
also compute a confidence interval for that of ρ˜1.
Based on ‖X‖2, ‖X‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉, Alice computes γa,
γb and γc as follows (see Ref. [25]):
γa :=
1
2k
[1 + 3
√
log(36/ǫPE)
k
]‖X‖2 − 1, (4)
γb :=
1
2k
[1 + 3
√
log(36/ǫPE)
k
]‖Y ‖2 − 1, (5)
γc :=
1
2k
〈X,Y 〉 − 6
√
log(144/ǫPE)
k3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2). (6)
The probability that the PE test passes, but Eve’s in-
formation computed with the covariance matrix charac-
terized by {Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc } is underestimated, is up-
per bounded by ǫPE. The parameter estimation is de-
signed as [γa ≤ Σmaxa ] ∧ [γb ≤ Σmaxb ] ∧ [γc ≥ Σminc ] and
Eve’s information is upper bounded by f(Σa,Σb,Σc) :=
g(ν1)+ g(ν2)− g(ν3), where ν1 and ν2 are the symplectic
eigenvalues of the covariance matrix[
Σmaxa I2 Σ
min
c σz
Σminc σz Σ
max
b I2
]
. (7)
ν3 = Σ
max
a − (Σminc )2/(1 + Σmaxb ), σz = diag(1,−1), and
g(x) := x+12 log2
x+1
2 − x−12 log2 x−12 .
In order to prove the security of the DM-CVQKD pro-
tocol, we restrict to collective attacks as the general at-
tacks can be reduced to Gaussian collective attacks via
post-selection technique or de Finetti reduction. Then,
the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) allows one
to compute the smooth min-entropy as a function of
the von Neumann entropy of a single subsystem. We
first introduce the leftover hash lemma and then use the
AEP to calculate the smooth min-entropy. The Leftover
Hash Lemma provides that the extractable bits, l, is
slightly smaller than the min-entropy of A conditioned
on B, Hmin(A|B) [26], i.e., l ≤ Hmin(A|B). This claim
requires the data satisfying perfect uniform randomness.
The smooth min-entropy is introduced to extend this
concept to a case of approximately uniform randomness.
In the four-state protocol, the ǫ-smooth min-entropy of
An conditioned on Bn of state τAB, H
ǫ
min(A
n|Bn)τ , is
bounded by Shannon entropy of An conditioned on Bn ,
H(An|Bn)τ . Namely, we have
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ ≥ H(An|Bn)τ −∆AEP , (8)
with
∆AEP =
√
n(16 + log 2ǫ2 + 8
√
log 2ǫ2 )
+4 ǫp + log
2
p2 .
(9)
Because of the non-zero failure probability in error cor-
rection (EC), the conditional state is no longer guaran-
teed to be a tensor-power. Indeed, the conditioned state
has the form
τn = p−1Πρ⊗nΠ,
where Π is a projector operator and p = Tr(Πρ⊗nΠ) is
the success probability of EC.
4In DM-CVQKD, the random variables satisfy the in-
dependent and identical distribution and have the same
probability to fall to n different quadrants, where n cor-
responding to the number of modulation states. Unfor-
tunately, the practical entropy H(U) = −∑4i=1 pi log pi
is lower than that of the ideal one when considering the
finite case and can be bounded by the maximum likeli-
hood estimator ofH(U) base on Antos and Kontoyannis’s
theorem [27]:
nH(U) ≥ nHˆMLE −∆ent, (10)
where ∆ent := n logn
√
2 log 2ǫent .
Analysis for General attacks.—Security of the DM-
CVQKD protocol for the general attacks can be reduced
to the case of collective attacks under certain conditions.
The DM protocol satisfies the experimental verifiable
conditions that the de Finetti theorem holds for states
of infinite-dimensional systems [28]. The first property
concerns the active symmetrization which requires the
protocol being covariant under the action of the unitary
group. We apply an active symmetrization step to the
state ρAB before applying the protocol, such an invari-
ance can also be enforced by symmetrizing the classical
data held by Alice and Bob. For the second property, the
key is required to be computed by two-universal hashing
in the privacy amplification step. This criterion is not
restrictive because two-universal hashing is optimal with
respect to the extractable length. In addition, the di-
mension of the relevant subspace H of the signal space
H in DM protocol is small, compared with N , which is
required by property 3.
The de Finetti representation theorem allows us to
drop this assumption, implying that security holds
against general attacks. A protocol is secure against gen-
eral attacks only when the map E approximately equals
to an ideal protocol F . The protocol is said to be ǫ-secure
if the diamond distance between the two maps is less than
ǫ: ‖E −F‖⋄ ≤ ǫ. Compared with security analysis of the
DV protocols [29, 30], an important technicality is that
we need to truncate the total Hilbert space globally to
replace it by a finite-dimensional one. We use an energy
test T to bound the number of measured modes below
some threshold. The security of the protocol E is then
reduced to two parts [31]:
‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ‖E − F‖⋄ + 2‖(I− P) ◦ T ‖⋄. (11)
where we used the fact that the CP maps E0 and F0 =
S ◦E0 cannot increase the diamond norm. Alice and Bob
perform a rotation operation on their s + t modes and
measure the last t modes of their data with heterodyne
detection. The energy test passes if the average energy
per mode is below dA for Alice and dB for Bob. The
thresholds dA and dB should be chosen properly to ensure
that the energy test passes with large success probability.
Since the coherent states in DM protocol in Hilbert
space displays the permutation invariance and rotation
symmetry, the generalized coherent state is given by [32]
|Λ, n〉 = det(1−ΛΛ†)n2 exp (
2∑
i,j=1
λijZij)|vacuum〉, (12)
which resolve the identity on the symmetric sub-
space [18]: ∫
D
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dνn(Λ) = IFU(n)2,2,n . (13)
In order to obtain an operator with finite norm, we con-
sider the finite-dimensional subspace F
U(n)≤K
2,2,n by bound-
ing the maximum energy of the states. In Ref. [18], an
approximate resolution of the identity is given by∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dνn(Λ) ≥ (1− ǫ)Π≤K , (14)
when the coherent states are restricted to Λ ∈ Dη with
Dη = {Λ ∈ D : ηI2 − ΛΛ† ≥ 0} for η ∈ [0, 1].
The finite energy version of the de Finetti theorem
allows us to bound the diamond norm of maps, provided
that the total number of the input state is upper bounded
by K. If E0 is ǫ-secure against collective attacks, then
‖E − F‖⋄ = ‖R ◦ (E0 −F0) ◦ P≤K‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)ǫ,
where K = max{1, n(dA + dB)
1+2
√
ln 8
ǫ
2n +
ln 8
ǫ
n
1−2
√
ln(8/ǫ)
2k
} and
T (n, η) = K
4
12 .
Theorem 2. If the DM protocol E0 is ǫ-secure against
Gaussian collective attacks, then the protocol E = R◦E0◦
T is ε-secure against general attacks with
ε = (2 +K4/6)ǫ. (15)
where R is privacy amplification and T is the energy test.
We find the mapR reduces the final key of the protocol
by ⌈2 log2
(
K+4
4
)⌉. This result provides security against
general attacks with a prefactor (2+K4/6) based on the
security against collective attack derived in previous part.
Discussion.—We have proved the security of the DM-
CVQKD protocol against general attacks in the finite
regime. This target is achieved with two steps. It is
first proved to be secure against Gaussian collective at-
tacks, and then is extended to the general attacks by
using Gaussian de Finetti reduction. This proof exploits
the rotation symmetrization and active symmetrization
operations which are crucial for the security analysis. In
the PE process, we use quantum state tomography to
derive confidence intervals for the covariance matrix in-
volving the parameters {Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc }. The leftover
hash lemma and AEP are also used for bounding shan-
non entropy of the DM protocol. We use an energy test
to ensure that the state shared between Alice and Bob
is suitably described by assigning the low-dimensional
Hilbert space to each mode. The bound provided by se-
curity against collective attacks suggests the security of
5DM protocol against general attack via the Gaussian de
Finetti reduction.
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In this appendix, we first recall definitions related to the composable security of quantum key distribution (QKD)
with discrete-modulation (DM) under collective attacks in Section I. In Section II, we give a complete description of
the QKD protocol E0 that is secure against collective attacks. In Section III, we show the parameter estimation (PE)
procedure and establish an upper bound for the failure probability of the PE test. In Section IV, we provide the
smooth min-entropy of a conditional state. In Section V, the security analysis of DM-CVQKD protocol against general
attacks is reduced to that of Gaussian collective attacks when the photon number of the input states is bounded.
I. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION AND COMPOSABLE SECURITY
In the continuous variable (CV) quantum cryptography, coherent state can be expanded in Fock state,
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∑∞
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉. (1)
Analogously, the state in discrete modulation (DM) can be expressed in Fock state. Without loss of generality, we
take four states as an example,
|φk〉 = e
−
|α|2
2√
λk
∑∞
n=0
α4n+4√
(4n+k)!
(−1)n|4n+ k〉, (2)
where λ0,2 =
1
2e
−α2 [cosh(α2)±cos(α2)], λ1,3 = 12e−α
2
[sinh(α2)±sin(α2)] for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. A CV system with DM is
a canonical infinite dimensional quantum system composed of an ensemble of 4N modes described by a Hilbert space,
H, corresponding to the four n-mode Fock spaces: H ∼= (F0
⊕
F1 · · ·
⊕
F3)
⊗n where Fi = Span(|i〉, . . . , |4k + i〉, . . .)
and |k〉 is a k-photon Fock state. For simplicity, we denote F = F0
⊕
F1 · · ·
⊕
F3. The fact that this space is infinite-
dimensional makes the security analysis of the protocol much more involved than that of BB84 protocol, already for
the case of collective attacks where the relevant space is F ⊗ F in a CV protocol.
A QKD protocol is described as a map E :
ρAB 7→ (SA,SB , C), (3)
where ρAB ∈ (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n is the n-mode bipartite state shared by Alice and Bob at the end of the distribution
phase. SA and SB are Alice and Bob’s final keys, and C corresponds to a transcript of all classical communication as
well as Alice and Bob’s raw data.
For the security analysis of the DM-CVQKD protocol, we follow the definition of Ref.[1]. A list of properties we
expect an ideal protocol to have is first given, then the security of real protocol is defined by indistinguishability from
the ideal case. Normally, these properties are defined as secrecy, correctness and robustness. The protocol will be
considered as robust if it outputs nontrivial keys when the adversary is passive. It means the adversary does disturb
quantum communications. We consider here the strongest type of security by exposing the protocol to general attacks.
This means that an adversary may arbitrarily tamer with the signals exchanged between Alice and Bob over quantum
channels[2]. Moreover, classical channels may be monitored by the adversary. In this paper, we first prove the security
of the four-state protocol against Gaussian collective attacks and then reduce the security proof of the general attacks
to that of collective attacks with Gaussian de Finetti reduction [3].
A protocol is correct, if the outputs of the protocol on Alice and Bob’s side are identical. It is εcor-correct if it is
εcor-indistinguishable from a correct protocol, from which we have Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor[4]. A protocol is secrecy if
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2the protocol generates a key S that is uniformly distributed and independent of the states of the system E held by
the adversary. A key is ǫ-secret from E if it is ǫ-close to a uniformly distributed key that is uncorrelated with the
adversary [5], that is
min
ρE
1
2
‖ρSE − ωS ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, (4)
where ωS is the completely mixed states on S. Correspondingly, a QKD protocol is secret, if, for any attack strategy,
ǫ = 0 whenever the protocol outputs a key. It is ǫsec-secret, if its output key is ǫ-secret with (1 − pabort)ǫ ≤ ǫsec,
where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts. This probability depends on the strategy of the adversary,
that is on the input state ΨABE. Indeed, the adversary can always choose to cut the line between Alice and Bob
and hence always make the protocol abortifacient. It is fine since the key will nevertheless be secure. An important
parameter is the robustness, ǫrob, of the protocol, which corresponds to the abortion probability if the adversary is
passive and if the characteristics of quantum channels are conformed to what was expected. For instance, in the case
of a DM-CVQKD protocol, a typical quantum channel is characterized by its transmittance T and excess noise ξ. A
QKD protocol is ǫ-secure if it is ǫsec-secret and ǫcor-correct with ǫsec + ǫcor ≤ ǫ.
An operational way of quantifying the security is to bound the diamond distance between two CPTP maps E and
F , where E denotes the practical DM-CVQKD protocol and F is an ideal version of the protocol. The ideal version
can be obtained by concatenating E and a (virtual) protocol P that replaces the final keys SA and SB by a perfect
key S. We denote F = P ◦ E and the protocol E is ǫ-secure if 12‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ǫ, which will be detailedly analyzed in
Sec.V.
In the analysis of the finite regime, symmetrization is a crucial property when analyzing the diamond distance.
The diamond distance can be bounded by computing the distance when applied to an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) state when the symmetrization property is satisfied. This is the idea behind the Postselection
technique[6], which shows that for such protocols, collective attacks are asymptotically optimal. The protocol is
invariant under permutations of the N particle pairs held by Alice and Bob after the distribution phase. Besides,
the rotation symmetrization as well as active symmetrization is also considered in the next section. Normally, the
operation is applied on classical data which corresponds to the quantum symmetrization since symmetrization is a
costly process that one would like to avoid in a practical implementation. We also assume that the measurement
devices of Alice and Bob are trusted and behave accordingly to their theoretical model. In the four-state protocol, the
state sent to Bob in the prepare-and-measure scheme is a mixture of four coherent states ρ = 14
∑3
k=0 |αk〉〈αk| with
αk = αe
i(2k+1) π4 . To avoid too much complication, we also assume that Alice’s state preparation and Bob’s detection
are ideal.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DM-CVQKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we devote to the security analysis of the DM-CVQKD protocol, denoted by E0, for which we prove
composable security against collective attacks. We focus on the EB version of the four-state protocol as the PM
protocol is usually used for guiding the experiment while the EB protocol is used for security analysis. In order to
prove security in terms of general attacks, one needs to add another step to the protocol, involving an energy test
which will be illustrated in Sec.V.
Security analysis. We now present one main result of this work. It states that the DM-CVQKD protocol
mentioned above is both ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secret if the length l of the secret key SA is appropriately selected for a
given set of observed value. See Box 1 for the different parameters.
If the length l of bit string S, which forms the secret key SA, satisfies the constraint
l ≤ 2n[2HˆMLE(U)− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )]− leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent, (5)
the protocol is ǫ secret with ǫ = ǫPE + ǫsm + ǫent+ ǫcor, where HˆMLE(U) denotes the empiric entropy of U , leackEC =
⌈log2 1ǫcor ⌉, ∆AEP :=
√
n(16 + log 2ǫ2sm
+ 8
√
log 2ǫ2sm
) + 4 ǫsmp + log
2
p2 , ∆ent := n logn
√
2 log 2ǫent and f is the function
computing the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s measurement results of a Gaussian state with covariance
matrix parametrized by {∑maxa ,∑maxb ,∑minc }. The function f is defined as:
f(x, y, z) := g(ν1) + g(ν2)− g(ν3), (6)
where ν1 and ν2 are the symplectic eigenvalue of the covariance matrix
[
xI2 zσz
zσz yI2
]
, ν3 = x− z21+y , σz = diag(1,−1) and
the entropy function g(x) := x+12 log2
x+1
2 − x−12 log2 x−12 .
3Box 1: The protocol E0 which mainly follow the discussion in [7].
1. State Preparation: Alice draws a string four-dimensional random vectors, each chosen from one of the three
following distribution: random vectors on the three-dimensional sphere with the appreciate radius, random vector
on the three-dimensional sphere with an appropriately fluctuating radius, or Gaussian vectors used for parameter
estimation.
2. Symmetrization: Alice randomly draws a random orthogonal transformation R from the orthogonal group O(4n).
R can be chosen uniformly in a well-chosen subset of O(2n) which has the advantage of allowing for efficient
descriptions of its elements. Alice computes the vector x′ = Rx, which is the image of x by the orthogonal
transformation R, and use this vector for modulation.
3. Distribution: Alice sends these states over quantum channel to Bob. The channel is assumed to be linear and is
modeled by a transmission T and a excess noise ξ.
4. Measurement: Bob receives the states after the quantum channel and measures them, with a heterodyne detection.
He obtains a 4n-dimensional vector y′. Alice describes R to Bob through the classical authenticated channel. Bob
applies R−1 to his vector y′ and obtains y = R−1y′.
5. Data Filtering: Alice reveals which subsets should be kept for the key distillation, which ones should be discarded
(decoy states) and which ones should be used for parameter estimation (Gaussian states).
6. Error Correction: Bob sends some side information to Alice over the classical channel, typically the syndrome U
of his string relative to a binary code they agreed on beforehand. Alice outputs a guess UA for the string of Bob.
Bob computes a hash of U of length ⌈log(1/ǫcor)⌉ and sends it to Alice who compares it with her own hash. If both
hashes coincide, the protocol resumes, otherwise it aborts. The value leakEC corresponds to the total number of bits
sent by Bob during the error correction phase.
7. Parameter Estimation: Bob sends nPE bits of information to Alice that allow her to obtain three values γa, γb
and γc defined in the following equation. If γa ≤ Σ
max
a , γb ≤ Σ
max
b and γc ≥ Σ
min
c , then the protocol continues.
Otherwise it aborts.
8. Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply a random universal2 hash function to their respective strings,
obtaining two strings SA and SB of size l.
In order to calculate the symplectic eigenvalues ν1,2 of the two-mode covariance matrix
γAB =
[
xI2 zσz
zσz yI2
]
, (7)
we need to define a second symplectic invariant,
∆ := ν1
2 + ν2
2 = det xI2 + det yI2 + 2det zσz, (8)
where det γAB := ν1
2ν2
2. The symplectic eigenvalues are solutions of the second order polynomial
z2 −∆z + det γAB = 0, (9)
which gives the solution ν21,2 =
1
2 [∆±
√
∆2 − 4 det γAB].
A. State Preparation
In the DM protocol, Gaussian modulation is used for parameter estimation procedure. Unfortunately, it is not
a priori possible to use two different modulations for key distribution and parameter estimation. We add a third
modulation consisting of decoy states to defend the eavesdropper. We call “key”, “decoy”, and “G” the modulations
correspondingly, respectively, to states used for the key distillation, decoy states, and states used for parameter
4estimation purpose. The three states are defined as [7]:
σdkey =
∫
pkey(α)|α〉〈α|dα, (10)
σddecoy =
∫
pdecoy(α)|α〉〈α|dα, (11)
σdG =
∫
pG(α)|α〉〈α|dα, (12)
where α ∈ Rd for the d-dimensional protocol. The probability distribution pdecoy, to make the states used for
parameter estimation indistinguishable from that used to distill a key, is chosen such that
pσdkey + (1 − p)σddecoy = σdG, (13)
with p = psuccd . After the exchange of quantum states is complete, Alice announces to Bob which states can be used
for the key, which states can be discarded and which states can be used for parameter estimation. We mainly discuss
the states used for key distillation.
Alice prepares the four coherent states |αei(2k+1)π/4〉 with k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The amplitude α (taken as a real
number) is chosen so as to maximize the secret key rate according to the expected experimental parameters involving
the transmission of line and excess noise. The prepared states can be expressed as a mixture of the four coherent
states ρ = 14Σ
3
k=0|αk〉〈αk|, where αk = α exp(i(2k + 1)π/4). The EB version makes use of a purification |Φ〉 of this
state given by ρ = trA(|Φ〉〈Φ|), which can be diagonalized as
ρ = λ0|φ0〉〈φ0|+ λ1|φ1〉〈φ1|+ λ2|φ2〉〈φ2|+ λ3|φ3〉〈φ3|, (14)
where λ0,2 =
1
2e
−α2 [cosh(α2)±cos(α2)], λ1,3 = 12e−α
2
[sinh(α2)±sin(α2)] and |φk〉 = e−α
2/2√
λk
∑∞
n=0
α4n+k√
(4n+k)!
(−1)n|4n+
k〉 for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. A particular purification of ρ is
|Φ〉 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉 = 1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉|αk〉, (15)
where |ψk〉 = 12
∑3
m=0 e
−i(1+2k)m( π4 )|φm〉 are orthogonal discrete-modulation states.
The EB version of the four-state protocol is described as follows. Alice prepares the entangled state and performs
the projective measurement {|ψ0〉〈ψ0|, |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, |ψ3〉〈ψ3|} on her half, thus preparing the coherent state |αk〉
with the measurement result corresponding to the kth state. The covariance of DM-CVQKD is given by
γ =
[
(VA + 1)I2 Zσz
Zσz (VA + 1)I2
]
, (16)
where VA = 2α
2 is the variance of the signal while I and σz is defined as before. For the four-state protocol, one has
the parameter
Z = VA(
λ
3/2
0
λ
1/2
1
+
λ
3/2
1
λ
1/2
2
+
λ
3/2
2
λ
1/2
3
+
λ
3/2
3
λ
1/2
0
). (17)
B. Distribution
Alice sends the prepared states through a quantum channel to Bob who measures either one of quadratures with a
homodyne or both quadratures with heterodyne detection. In this paper, we consider a situation that the quantum
channel is exposed to the eavesdropper, Eve. The quantum state is described by an arbitrary density operator
ρˆ⊗n ∈ D(H⊗n). The N-mode quantum channel is a linear map E : ρˆ⊗n → E(ρˆ⊗n) ∈ D(H⊗n). A multimode quantum
channel can be represented by a unitary interaction U between an input state ρˆ and a pure state |Φ〉E of ancillary
NE modes coupling with the environment. After that, the output of the channel can be achieved by tracing out the
environment after interaction. We note that in the physical representation provided by Stinespring dilation, there is
also an output of the environment. Here, we consider the complementary quantum channel Eˆ : ρˆ⊗n → Eˆ(ρˆ⊗n) which
is obtained by tracing out the system after interaction.
5We assume that the quantum channel is linear and its input-output relations of the quadrature operators in Heisen-
berg representation are given by
Xout = gXXin +BX , Pout = gPPin +BP , (18)
where BX and BP denote the additional noises of the environment which are uncorrelated with the input quadratures
Xin and Pin. Such relations have been extensively used, for instance, in the context of quantum non-demolition
measurements of continuous variables, which are related to the linearized approximation commonly used in quantum
optics. Gaussian channels (whose inputs and outputs are all Gaussian state) are an example of the linear quantum
channels. In particular, some linear quantum channels may be non-Gaussian when the additional noises BX and BP
don’t obey Gaussian distribution.
In a linear quantum channel, the transmission coefficients are characterized by TX = g
2
X and TP = g
2
P , and the
variance of the additional noises are characterized by BX and BP . These quantities remain held when the modulation
of Alice is discrete modulation, the the measured value is the same as that of the Gaussian modulation (as these
values are intrinsic properties of the channel). The covariance matrix can be determined with the known information
and Eve’s information can be bounded with the Gaussian optimality theorem. The covariance matrix ΓAB of the
state in the entanglement-based is given by
ΓAB =
[
(VA + 1)I2
√
TZσz√
TZσz (TVA + 1 + Tξ)I2
]
, (19)
where VA, T and ξ represent Alice’s variance, the channel transmission and the excess noise evaluated experimentally
in the prepare and measure scenario.
C. Measurement
In the EB DM-CVQKD protocol, Alice and Bob each has access to 2n modes. The 2n coherent states kept by
Alice can be expressed as {|XrA+ iP rA〉}{r=1,2,··· ,2n} and those sent to Bob are {|XrB+ iP rB〉}{r=1,2,··· ,2n}, respectively.
These modes are detected by heterodyne detection and the 4n modes are achieved, corresponding to the 2n position
quadratures {X1k , X2k , · · · , X2nk } and the 2n phase quadratures {P 1k , P 2k , · · · , P 2nk }, ∀k ∈ {A,B}. The relationships
between Alice and Bob’s quadratures can be given by
XrA =
VA
(VA + 1)2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1
λ
1/2
k
·XrB, P rA = −
VA
(VA + 1)2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1
λ
1/2
k
· P rB , (20)
where VA is the variance of the coherent state and λk can be calculated from Eq.(14).
In the equivalent prepare-and-measure version of the DM-CVQKD protocol, Alice doesn’t need to possess and
measure coherent states. In experiments, Alice prepares the 2n coherent states {|XrB + iP rB〉}{r=1,2,··· ,2n} and sends
them to Bob. Alice keeps data {X1A, X2A, · · · , X2nA } and {P 1A, P 2A, · · · , P 2nA } in her laboratory rather than coherent
states {|X1A+ iP 1A〉, |X2A+ iP 2A〉, · · · , |X2nA + iP 2nA 〉}, where the amplitude α is chosen so as to maximize the secret key
rate with the expected experimental parameters (transmittance T and excess noise ξ).
After receiving Alice’s signals, Bob performs heterodyne detection on them and obtains two string real random
variables {XrB} and {P rB}, ∀r ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n}. Alice and Bob apply a reverse reconciliation to deal with these codes.
The signs bi of XB and PB are used for encoding the raw key bit. Namely, we have
bi :=


11 if XB > 0 and PB>0,
01 if XB < 0 and PB > 0,
00 if XB < 0 and PB < 0,
10 if XB > 0 and PB < 0.
(21)
All Alice needs to do is to recover the string b = (b1, b2, · · · , b2n). In order to help Alice correct her data, Bob sends
some side information over classical channels, typically the syndrome of his string relative to a binary code they agreed
on beforehand.
D. Active Symmetrization
A protocol is said to be invariant under some set of transformation G if for any element g ∈ G, there exits a
completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map Kg such that
E ◦ g = Kg ◦ E . (22)
6If we consider here for G the group of conjugate passive symplectic operations applied on Alice’s n modes and Bob’s
n modes, then for a given operation g applied to the states, the map Kg is obtained by applying the orthogonal
transformations corresponding to g on the classical data measured by Alice and Bob. If the protocol is invariant
under the whole group, then it is sufficient to look at Gaussian states to prove security against collective attacks
[8]. One simple way to ensure that a protocol is invariant under a set G of transformations is for Alice and Bob
to actively apply random transformations of G to their states. Particularly, the security can be done by assuming
they are sharing Gaussian states in the entangled version of the protocol if Alice and Bob both apply random
orthogonal transformations to their classical vectors in the prepare-and-measure scheme. The goal of symmetrization
in security analysis is to make sure that the state shared by Alice and Bob is as isotropic as possible. In addition, the
symmetrization also plays an important role in preventing Eve’s attack.
We apply an active symmetrization step to the state ρAB before the protocol to make sure that the protocol
is invariant under specific transformations [7]. To perform the active symmetrization, we choose a subset F of
the orthogonal group for Alice and Bob, and to apply the same element f ∈ F to their data before starting the
postprocessing. We take F to be a subset of the orthogonal group with following properties as taking for F the whole
orthogonal group is not necessary: drawing a random element f from the uniform measure on F should be doable
with resources scaling at most linearly in n, the description of f should also be linear in n, and applying f (or f−1)
to a random vector of Rn should also be at most linear in n [7]. Moreover, the symmetrization should work as well
as possible, meaning that F should symmetrize the state as much as possible. Construction of such possible subsets
F can be found in [7].
E. Error Correction
From the classical communication perspective, error correction is referred to channel coding for the so-called additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, where a binary modulation is usually sent over an AWGN channel. The present
protocol can thus be seemed as a hybrid between the Gaussian modulation protocol, with which it shares the physical
implementation as well as the security proofs based on the optimality of Gaussian states, and the DM protocol with
post-selection, for which error correction is substantially convenient to perform. The error correction procedure aims
to help Alice learn the string U . A possible technique to perform error correction is called the low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes. However, the LDPC codes are not universal in a sense that they have not been optimized for each
channel. A special LDPC code, the multi-edge type LDPC code, was developed for the low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). Such a code displays good performance with low rates even though it could not solve our problem completely.
The practical transmission rate R is linked to the reconciliation efficiency β with
β =
R
CGauss
, (23)
where CGauss =
1
2 log2(1 + s) is the capacity of the AWGN channel (which is achieved with a Gaussian modulation)
and s is the SNR. In this protocol, this capacity can not be reached as we consider the binary modulation. Similarly,
the maximal value of mutual information between Alice and Bob is given by the capacity of the AWGN channel:
CBI-AWGN(s) = −
∫
φs(x) log2(φs(x))dx −
1
2
log2(2πe) +
1
2
log2(s), (24)
where
φs(x) =
√
s
8π
(es(x+1)
2/2 + e−s(x−1)
2/2). (25)
Moreover, we rewrite the reconciliation efficiency of the DM protocol which is used for assessing the quality of the
error correction as
βdiscrete := βmodulation
R
CBI-AWGN
, (26)
with βmodulation =
CGauss
CBI-AWGN
. Therefore, the reconciliation efficiency can be calculated as
βdiscrete =
(4n− leakEC)2n log2(1 + s)
C2
BI-AWGN
, (27)
7where the SNR is that of the expected linear quantum channel mapping X to Y . The reconciliation shows how much
information was extracted through the error correction procedure, comparing to the available mutual information
corresponding to a linear quantum channel of transmittance T and excess noise ξ. Particularly, we have:
s =
TVA
2 + Tξ
. (28)
The quantity 12 log2(1 + s) is the mutual information for each use of the channel, leading to an upper bound on
the quantity of classical information that can be transmitted over the classical channel Xi 7→ Yi. The reconciliation
efficiency therefore gives the distance between the error correction procedure and the ideal one with β = 1.
We show an approach to generate a code of rate R/k out of a code of rate R at the end of quantum exchange.
Alice and Bob share the two correlated vectors x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) with xi = ±α/
√
2 and y = (y1, y2, · · · , yN ). We
use the concatenation of a capacity-achieving code C of length m and a repetition code of length k. Bob starts by
defining the vector Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Ym) where Yi = sig(yk(i−1)+1) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} with N = mk,. The goal
of the reconciliation is for Alice to compute the vector Y . To do this, Bob sends some side information, the vector
{|y1|, |y2|, · · · , |yN |}, the m vectors {(1, sgnyk(i−1)+1 × sgnyk(i−1)+2, · · · , sgn(yk(i−1)+1 × yki))}, and the syndrome of
Y for the code C. This scheme allows Alice and Bob to extract m bits out of their initial N = km data. After this
step, it is necessary to judge whether X = Y or not. To achieve this, the usual technique is for Alice and Bob to
choose a random universal hash function mapping 4n bit strings to string of length ⌈log(1/ǫcor)⌉. When Bob reveals
his hash to Alice, the protocol resumes if both hashes coincide and will be aborted otherwise. The length of the hash
is chosen so that the protocol is ǫcor-correct.
F. Parameter Estimation
In this section, we suggest the parameter estimation procedure for the DM-CVQKD protocol. Furthermore, taking
advantage of specific symmetries of the protocols in phase space [9], it is possible to reduce this number to 3, the
variances of Alice and Bob’s reduced states and the variance. It is a coarse-grained version of quantum tomography
because the parameter estimation only relays on a small number of the parameters of the underlying quantum state.
On the positive side, the covariance matrix can be symmetrized through a technique similar to the one explained in [9].
To implement the parameter estimation, we show that quantum state tomography, together with an appropriate data
analysis procedure, yields the reliable and tight error bounds, specified in terms of confidence regions [10]. Confidence
regions are subsets of the state space in which the real state exists with high probability, independently of any prior
assumption on the distribution of the possible states.
The quantum state tomography is applied by measuring a portion of quantum states in the k-dimension Hilbert
space, together with an appropriate data analysis procedure, resulting in a reliable and tight error bounds ǫPE and
confidence regions. ǫPE denotes the probability of discarding the protocol. The protocol will be abandoned if ǫPE = 1.
From this point of view, we would like to set ǫPE as small as possible to make the protocol more robust. On the
other hand, the region R becomes the total space, H, if ǫPE is set to be zero. For the protocol, the size of the region
will influence the tightness of the bound of the secret key rate. The large confidence regions may lead to failure of
detecting eavesdropper, whereas the smaller confidence regions lead to the tight key rates. It is necessary to find out
a balance of secrecy and robustness. The probability of abandoning the protocol, ǫPE, is an important parameter that
can be given by
∀ρn+k ∈ H⊗(n+k),Pr [ρn ∈ R] ≥ 1− ǫPE, (29)
where ρn and R are the output of the map tomography applied to ρn+k. ρn includes n sets of data and R is a
confidence region obtained from k sets of data.
Subsequently, we estimate the covariance matrix of a bipartite state ρ˜nAB that is obtained from ρ
2n
AB after a rotation
symmetrization, characterized by three parameters:
Σa :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈X2Ai〉+ 〈P 2A,i〉] (30)
Σb :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈X2Bi〉+ 〈P 2B,i〉] (31)
Σc :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈XA,iXB,i〉 − 〈PA,iPB,i〉] (32)
8where XA,i and PA,i are the quadrature operators
1√
2
(aˆi+aˆ
†
i) and
1√
2
(aˆi−aˆ†i ) of the ith mode of Alice. In the protocol,
the assignment of parameter estimation is to find confidence regions of the parameters Σa, Σb, Σc which are different
from the protocol that estimates tmin and σ
2
max [11]. For a given covariance matrix, the state maximizing Eve’s
information is Gaussian. The only possible loophole would be that there might exist a DM state, compatible with a
Gaussian assumption, which would be attacked by Eve than the Gaussian state estimated by Alice and Bob. This
loophole is caused by an inaccurate understanding of covariance matrix in the finite-size scenario and can be solved
by introducing decoy states. Therefore, we conjecture that the Gaussian optimality still holds in a non-asymptotic
scenario, and in the following, we make the assumption of a Gaussian channel. After that, we have the symmetrized
matrix that can be used for deriving the secret key rate:
Γsym :=
n⊕
i=1


Σa 0 Σc ∗
0 Σa ∗ −Σc
Σc ∗ Σb 0
∗ −Σc 0 Σb

 . (33)
The entries will be considered in the procedure of rotation symmetrization. Based on the properties of Holevo
information, it is sufficient to obtain a confidence region of {Σa,Σb,Σc} in the forms [0,Σmaxa ]× [0,Σmaxb ]× [Σmaxc ,∞].
If the variance of Alice’s initial state is V , the expected transmittance of the quantum channel is T and the expected
excess noise is ξ, we have
Σmaxa = V + δa, (34)
Σmaxb = T (V − 1) + 1 + Tξ + δb, (35)
Σminc =
√
T (V − 1)(λ
3/2
0
λ
1/2
1
+
λ
3/2
1
λ
1/2
2
+
λ
3/2
2
λ
1/2
3
+
λ
3/2
3
λ
1/2
0
)− δc, (36)
where δa, δb and δc are chosen to ensure both robustness and high key rate of the system.
The quantum state tomography would be simplified if the initial states satisfy independent and identical distribution
of the form ρn+k. Unluckily, different from the finite-dimensional systems such as DVQKD, whose density matrix
elements are bounded, the coefficients of covariance matrix are a priori unbounded. A solution to this issue is to apply
a rotation symmetrization to the state ρn+k before measuring k subsystems and inferring properties for the remaining
n modes. A new problem appears when the output state of the tomographic procedure will loss the independent and
identical distribution structure, which makes the analysis of collective attacks more complicated. The tool used for
solving this problem is to apply quantum de Finetti theorem, from which a class of states in H⊗n, namely symmetric
states, can be approximated by mixture of independent and identical distributed states.
We consider the security analysis of the DM protocol with collective attacks characterized by the covariance matrix
of ρAB. The symmetrization that makes sense of CV QKD is the one that maximally symmetrizes the state while
leaving the parameters of the covariance matrix unchanged. Since we make the assumption of collective attacks, the
covariance matrix Γ can be well obtained and estimated by Alice and Bob. The general form of Γ is given by
Γ :=


Σ11a Σ
12
a Σ
11
c Σ
12
c
Σ21a Σ
22
a Σ
21
c −Σ22c
Σ11c Σ
12
c Σ
11
b Σ
12
b
Σ21c −Σ22c Σ21b Σ22b

 . (37)
We make use of the rotation symmetrization rather than the traditional permutation symmetrization to transform Γ
into Γsym. The reconciliation is always optimized for a Gaussian channel, and hence Bob’s data Y can be modeled
as Y = tX + z, where t is a transmission factor and z is a random variable modeling the added noise with a variance
of σ2. Therefore, the reconciliation procedure would not be affected if Alice and Bob perform the same random
orthogonal transformation R ∈ O(n) on their respective data, since one would have RY = tRX+ z′, where z′ denotes
the rotated noise with variance σ2 and R takes the form of
[
sin θ cos θ
− cos θ sin θ
]
with θ being the rotation angle. If Alice and
Bob apply such a random orthogonal transformation and erase which state has been performed, they obtain a series
of symmetrized data that the covariance matrix takes the form of Γsym. The parameters of matrix Γ and Γsym satisfy
the constraints Σa = (Σ
11
a + Σ
22
a )/2, Σb = (Σ
11
b + Σ
22
b )/2 and Σc = (Σ
11
c − Σ22c )/2. Alice and Bob would actually
apply the conjugate orthogonal transformations to these position and phase quadratures. The transformation whose
2n⊗2n matrix in phase space is achieved from the original one by flipping the sign of all rows whose label corresponds
to the p quadrature. Therefore, we have
RotSym : P=(P⊗(n+k)A ⊗ P⊗(n+k)B )→ P=(P⊗(n+k)A ⊗ P⊗(n+k)B )
ρ
⊗(n+k)
AB 7→ [⊕n+ki=1 Ri]ρ⊗(n+k)AB [⊕n+ki=1 RTi ]
(38)
9The above-mentioned symmetrization, which applies orthogonal transformations in phase space rather than per-
mutations in state space, has several characterastics. It allows the matrix of Alice and Bob to be characterized by
the three parameters which can be estimated experimentally. Besides, it provides enables us an approach of the
unconditional security analysis using a de Finetti theorem.
We can derive the confidence interval of the covariance matrix with the yielded quantum states. For these Gaussian
states, k modes are heterodyned for calculating a confidence region of Σa, Σb and Σc. Alice and Bob first measure
k modes each with heterodyne detection, inferring a confidence region of the covariance matrix of the k remaining
Gaussian states. We take X2 and Y2 denoting the 2k vectors of Alice and Bob’s measurement results, respectively.
We consider a simple condition that Bob sends his 2k measurement results to Alice through a classical authorized
channel for reverse reconciliation. Under the circumstance, it is direct for Alice to compute ‖X2‖2, ‖Y2‖2 and 〈X2, Y2〉
which is useful for the parameter estimation. The procedure of Alice and Bob to exchange their measurement data
for parameter estimation still needs further exploration.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
As explained previous, the aim of parameter estimation is to give confidence regions of Σa, Σb and Σc and sift out
these data whose variances pass the test. In a case that ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉 are known to Alice and Bob, they
can set about calculating the confidence region.
After Bob receives Alice’s states, they pick up these Gaussian states that used for parameter estimation. Alice and
Bob split their own 2k states into two sets of k modes, denoted as A1, B1 and A2, B2. A1 and B1 can be used for
estimating A2 and B2, and conversely A2 and B2 can also Be used for estimate A1 and B1. Without loss of generality,
we consider the former situation with
‖X1‖2 =
k∑
i=1
α2A,i, ‖Y1‖2 =
k∑
i=1
α2B,i. (39)
As αA,i and αB,i are with Gaussian distribution,
‖X1‖2
α2 and
‖Y1‖2
α2 obey the chi square distribution (χ
2(k)). In the
following, we introduce the lemma of tail bounds of χ2(k) distribution.
Lemma 1. Let U be a χ2 statistics with k degrees of freedom. For any x > 0, we have
Pr
[
U − k ≥ 2
√
kx+ 2x
]
≤ e−x, Pr
[
k − U ≥ 2
√
kx
]
≤ e−x. (40)
We consider a case that Alice distributes ρ1 to {A1, B1} and ρ2 to {A2, B2}, respectively. It is feasible for Alice to
compute the confidence region of ‖Xi‖2, ‖Yi‖2 and 〈Xi, Yi〉 (i = 1, 2) as she has knowledge of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉.
Therefore, we have X = (X1, X2), Y = (Y1, Y2), ‖X‖2 = ‖X1‖2 + ‖X2‖2 and ‖Y ‖2 = ‖Y1‖2+ ‖Y2‖2. The following is
the lemma of building the confidence region of ‖X1‖2, ‖Y1‖2 and 〈X1, Y1〉 based on ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉.
Lemma 2. For a given vector X ∈ C2k, we have
Pr
[
‖X1‖2 ≥ 1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
ln(2/ǫ)
k
]
‖X‖2
]
≤ ǫ (41)
Pr
[
‖X1‖2 ≤ 1
2
[
1− 11
5
√
ln(2/ǫ)
k
]
‖X‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (42)
where X1 is the projection of X on a random subspace of dimension k and ǫ ≥ 2e−k/2.
Proof. Attributing to ‖X‖2 = ‖X1‖2 + ‖X2‖2, the two variables ‖X1‖
2
α2 and
‖X2‖2
α2 are subject to the chi square
distribution, and hence ‖X‖
2
α2 obeys the χ
2(2k) distribution. Combining with Lemma 1, we obtain
Pr
[‖Xi‖2
α2
≥ k + 2
√
kx+ 2x
]
≤ e−x, Pr
[‖Xi‖2
α2
≤ k − 2
√
kx
]
≤ e−x. (43)
Consequently, we have
Pr
[
‖X1‖2
‖X1‖2 + ‖X2‖2 ≥
k + 2
√
kx+ 2x
2(k + x)
]
≤ 2e−x, Pr
[
‖X1‖2
‖X1‖2 + ‖X2‖2 ≤
k − 2√kx
2(k + x)
]
≤ 2e−x (44)
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After iterating γ =
√
x/k into the right of Eq. (44) for γ ∈ [0, 1], we have
1 + 2γ + 2γ2
2(1 + γ2)
≤ 1
2
(1 +
5γ
2
) and
1− 2γ
2(1 + γ2)
≥ 1
2
(1− 11
5
γ). (45)
With the relationship 〈X,Y 〉 = 〈X1, Y1〉 + 〈X2, Y2〉 in mind, we need give the confidence region of 〈Xi, Yi〉 due to
the data on 〈X,Y 〉.
Lemma 3. Given two vectors X,Y ∈ R4k, we have
Pr
[
〈X,Y 〉 − (1 + 27
10
√
x
k
)
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) ≤ 4〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 〈X,Y 〉+ (1 + 27
10
√
x
k
)
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)] ≥ 1− 8e−x, (46)
where X1 and Y1 are the projections of X and Y on a random subspace of dimension 2k for any x ≤ k/2.
Proof. We use Lemma 2 to prove this lemma with ‖X + Y ‖2 = ‖X‖2 + 2〈X,Y 〉 + ‖Y ‖2, which is the property of
2-norm. Based on the union bound, except with probability no more than 8e−x for x ≤ k, one has
1
2
[
1− 11
5
√
x
k
]
‖X + Y ‖2 ≤ ‖X1 + Y1‖2 ≤ 1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
x
k
]
‖X + Y ‖2, (47)
−1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
x
k
]
‖X − Y ‖2 ≤ −‖X1 − Y1‖2 ≤ −1
2
[
1− 11
5
√
x
k
]
‖X − Y ‖2. (48)
Combing with ‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2 ≥ 2〈X,Y 〉, we have
〈X,Y 〉 − 47
10
√
x
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) ≤ 2〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 〈X,Y 〉+ 47
10
√
x
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) . (49)
We note in particular that the following bounds hold
Pr
[
〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 1
2
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
2
√
x
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)] ≤ 4e−x, (50)
Pr
[
|〈X1, Y1〉 − 〈X2, Y2〉| ≥ 5
√
x
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]
≤ 8e−x. (51)
Subsequently, we have the confidence region of ‖X2‖, ‖Y2‖ and 〈X2, Y2〉 by using the confidence region of ‖X1‖, ‖Y1‖
and 〈X1, Y1〉.
Lemma 4. For an 8k-dimensional probability distribution P (X,Y ) with X = (X1, X2) ∈ R4n and Y = (Y1, Y2) ∈ R4k,
which are symmetrized by rotation operation, we have
Pr
[
‖X2‖2 ≥
[
1 + 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2k
]
‖X1‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (52)
Pr
[
‖X2‖2 ≤
[
1− 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2k
]
‖X1‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (53)
Pr
[
〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ 〈X1, Y1〉 − 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2k
(‖X1‖2 + ‖Y1‖2)
]
≤ 4ǫ, (54)
where ǫ satisfies the constraint log(2/ǫ)2k ≤ 0.05.
Proof. The first two inequalities can be derived from Lemma II.1 in Ref. [12] due to an observation that for γ ∈ [0, 0.05],
we have
1 + 2γ + 2γ2
1− 2γ ≥ 1 + 4γ,
1− 2γ
1 + 2γ + 2γ2
≤ 1− 4γ. (55)
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Similarly, we have the above inequalities for ‖Y1‖2 and ‖Y2‖2. Using the strategy as in the proof of Lemma 3, except
with probability 8ǫ, one can obtain
〈X1, Y1〉 − 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2k
(‖X1‖2 + ‖Y1‖2) ≤ 〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ 〈X1, Y1〉+ 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2k
(‖X1‖2 + ‖Y1‖2). (56)
Now, we show the loophole of the parameter estimation for [γa ≤ Σmaxa ]∧[γb ≤ Σmaxb ]∧[γc ≥ Σminc ]. The problematic
cases are the ones where X1 or X2 are not compatible with their own estimation procedure. Followings are the specific
cases,
E
‖X‖2
bad := [‖X1‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [‖X2‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [(E‖X2‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖X1‖2 ≤ a)] ∨ [(E‖X1‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖X2‖2 ≤ a)], (57)
where a and b will be optimized later. Similarly, one has the definition
E
‖Y ‖2
bad := [‖Y1‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [‖Y2‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [(E‖Y2‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖Y1‖2 ≤ a)] ∨ [(E‖Y1‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖Y2‖2 ≤ a)] (58)
which is a bad event for the estimation of B1 and B2’s variances. The bad event for the correlations is given by
E
〈X,Y 〉
bad := [〈X1, Y1〉 ≤ c] ∨ [〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ c] ∨ [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ∨ [(E〈X1, Y1〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X2, Y2〉 ≥ c)].
(59)
Theorem 5. The probability of the bad event E
|X‖2
bad ∨ E‖Y ‖
2
bad ∨ E〈X,Y 〉bad is upper bounded by ǫ for the parameters
a =
1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
log(36/ǫ)
k
]
‖X‖2 or a = 1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
log(36/ǫ)
k
]
‖Y ‖2, (60)
b = a
[
1 +
432
ǫ
exp[−k/16]
]
, (61)
c =
1
2
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
2
√
log(72/ǫ)
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2), (62)
d = c− 2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
√
log(144/ǫ)
k
. (63)
Proof. Based on Lemma 4, we define ǫ1(a, y) = 2 exp
(
−2k [y−a4a ]2) such that Pr [(‖X1‖2 ≤ a) ∧ (‖X2‖2 ≥ y)] ≤
Pr
[‖X2‖2 ≥ ya‖X1‖2] ≤ ǫ1(a, y). For γ = b/a, we have
∞∑
ν=1
bν+1ǫ1(a, bν) = 2a
∞∑
ν=0
(γ + 2 + ν) exp
[
− k
16
(γ + ν)2
]
(64)
≤ 2a exp [−kγ2/16] ∞∑
ν=0
(γ + 2 + ν) exp
[
−2kγν
16
]
(65)
≤ 8a(γ + 2) exp [−kγ2/16] , (66)
where the last inequality holds provided that exp
[
− 2kγ16
]
≤ 1/2. Using Lemma 8 in [13], we achieve
Pr
[
(‖X1‖2 ≤ a) ∧ (E‖X2‖2 ≥ a+ δ)
] ≤ 24a
δ
exp [−k/16] . (67)
According to Lemma 9 in [13], for c ≥ d, we obtain
Pr [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d− δ) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ≤ d
δ
· Pr [(〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] (68)
≤ d
δ
· Pr [〈X1, Y1〉 − 〈X2, Y2〉 ≥ c− d] (69)
≤ 8d
δ
exp
[
−k
[
c− d
5(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]2]
. (70)
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Taking d = c− δ, we have
Pr [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ c− 2δ) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ≤ 8c
δ
exp
[
−k
[
δ
5(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]2]
. (71)
For the suitable values of a, b, c and d that enables each of the 18 individual events with probability ǫ/18, the
probability pPEbad of the parameter estimation is calculated as
pPEbad ≤ Pr
[
E
‖X‖2
bad
]
+ Pr
[
E
‖Y ‖2
bad
]
+ Pr
[
E
〈X,Y 〉
bad
]
≤ ǫ. (72)
This is achieved for the values of a, b, c and d given by
a =
1
2
[
1 +
5
2
√
log(36/ǫ)
k
]
‖X‖2, (73)
b = a
[
1 +
432
ǫ
exp[−k/16]
]
, (74)
c =
1
2
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
2
√
log(72/ǫ)
k
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2), (75)
d = c− 2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
√
log(144/ǫ)
k
, (76)
where the second equality is derived from Eq. 67, the third equality is from Eq. 50 and the last equality is from
Eq. 71.
Finally, we have the parameters
γa :=
1
2k
[
1 + 3
√
log(36/ǫPE)
k
]
‖X‖2 − 1, (77)
γb :=
1
2k
[
1 + 3
√
log(36/ǫPE)
k
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1, (78)
γc :=
1
2k
〈X,Y 〉 − 6
√
log(144/ǫPE)
k3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2), (79)
where a regime of n satisfies the constraint[
1 +
5
2
√
log(36/ǫ)
k
][
1 +
360
ǫ
exp[−k/16]
]
≤ 1 + 3
√
log(36/ǫ)
k
, (80)
which exists in practical implementations. Due to the fact that√
9 log(72/ǫ) +
√
4 log(144/ǫ) ≤
√
2(9 log(72/ǫ) + 4 log(144/ǫ)) ≤ 6
√
log(144/ǫ), (81)
the parameters γA, γB and γC give the confidence region of the covariance matrix when the probability of the bad
event in parameter estimation is less than ǫ.
IV. SMOOTH MIN-ENTROPY
The smooth min-entropy is associated to the secrecy of the protocol with leftover hash lemma. As analyzed in
[3], the most general attacks can be reduced to collective Gaussian attacks by applying the Gaussian de Finetti
reduction. In order to analysis the security of the DM-CVQKD protocol, we first restrict the attacks to collective
attacks. Moreover, the conditional smooth min-entropy can be estimated using the asymptotic equipartition property
(AEP). In this section, we introduce the leftover hash lemma and use the AEP to calculate the smooth min-entropy.
We consider a random variable X that is partially known to the eavesdropper, Eve, who possesses side information
E correlated to X . The Leftover Hash Lemma [14] gives the number l of extractable bits, which is slightly smaller
13
than the min-entropy of A conditioned on B, denoted Hmin(A|B). The relationship between l and Hmin(A|B) is given
by
l ≤ Hmin(A|B). (82)
However, this claim is restricted to the extraction of perfectly uniform randomness. We take the smooth min-entropy
to extend this concept to a general case of approximately uniform randomness. Roughly, for any ǫ ≥ 0, the ǫ-smooth
min-entropy of A given B, denoted Hǫmin(A|B), is described as the maximum value of Hmin(A|B) evaluated for all
density operators ρ˜ that are ǫ-close to ρ in terms of the purified distance.
Definition 1. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB). The min-entropy of A conditioned on B is given by
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σB∈S=(HB)
sup{λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2−λIA ⊗ σB}. (83)
Similarly, the smooth min− entropy of A conditioned on B is given by
Hǫmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρAB∈BǫρAB
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜. (84)
Meanwhile, the ǫ-ball of states close to ρ ∈ S≤(H) is given by
Bǫ(ρ) := {ρ˜ ∈ S≤(H) : P (ρ, ρ˜) ≤ ǫ}. (85)
The quantum AEP is the statement that, in the limit of a large number of identical repetitions of a random quantum
experiment, the output sequence is virtually certain to come from the typical set, each member of which is almost
equally likely. We take the conditional state that has the form
τ⊗n = p−1Πρ⊗nΠ, (86)
where Π is a projector operator and p = tr(Πρ⊗nΠ) is the probability of successful error correction. We can bound
the smooth min-entropy from a conditional state τ⊗n to an i.i.d state ρ⊗n, i.e.,
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ =max
τ˜
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ˜ (87)
=max
τ˜ ,σB
− log ‖σ 12B τ˜⊗nABσ
1
2
B‖∞ (88)
=max
τ˜ ,σB
− log ‖σ 12B p˜−1Πρ˜⊗nABΠσ
1
2
B‖∞ (89)
≥max
τ˜ ,σB
− log ‖σ 12B ρ˜⊗nABσ
1
2
B‖∞ − log
1
p
(90)
=max
ρ˜
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)ρ˜ − log 1
p
(91)
=Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)ρ − log 1
p
(92)
The smooth relative min-entropy can be related to relative Re´nyi entropies given by
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)ρ ≥ Hα(An|Bn)ρ − g(ǫ)
α− 1 , (93)
where α ∈ (1, 2] and g(ǫ) = − log 1−√1− ǫ2. For α = 1 + 1√
n
, we obtain
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)ρ ≥ Hα(An|Bn)ρ −
√
n log
2
ǫ2
. (94)
According to Lemma 6.3 in Ref.[15], we have α-Re´nyi entropy by using von Neumann entropy given by
Hα(A|B)ρ = H(A|B)ρ − 4(α− 1)(log υ)2, (95)
where υ =
√
2−H3/2(A|B)ρ +
√
2H1/2(A|B)ρ + 1. In the four-state DM-CVQKD protocol, the convergence parameter
becomes υ ≤
√
2−Hmin(A|B)ρ +
√
2Hmax(A|B)ρ + 1 ≤ 4. Up to now, we can achieve
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ ≥ H(An|Bn)ρ − 16
√
n−√n log 2
ǫ2
− log 1
p
. (96)
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In order to establish the relationship between Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ and H(An|Bn)τ , we employ the duality property of
the conditional von Neumann entropy. Assume ρABC is a purification of ρAB and τAnBnCn =
1
p (Π⊗ IC)ρ⊗nABC(Π⊗ IC)
is that of τAnBn . Applying Theorem 9 from [16] to ρ
⊗n, we obtain
1
n
Hǫmin(A
n|Cn)ρ ≥ H(A|C)ρ − 8√
n
√
log
2
ǫ2
. (97)
According to the definition of the smooth min-entropy, there exists an operator ρ¯AnCn satisfying the properties
λ · (IA ⊗ ρC)⊗n − ρ¯AnCn ≥ 0, ‖ρ⊗nAC − ρ¯AnCn‖1 ≤ ǫ, (98)
where λ := 2
−H(An|Cn)ρ+8
√
n log 2
ǫ2 . Similarly, we define τ¯AnBnCn :=
1
p¯Πρ¯AnBnCnΠ, and due to Π < IABC , we have
T =
1
2
‖τAnCn − τ¯AnCn‖1 ≤ ǫ
p
(99)
τ¯AnCn ≤ 1
p¯
ρ¯AnCn ≤ 1
p¯
λ · (idA ⊗ ρE)⊗n. (100)
In Eq.(99), we use the assumption that p2 ≤ p¯ ≤ 2p. The conditional von Neumann entropy can be described as
H(An|Cn)τ¯ = tr(τ¯AnCn(IA ⊗ log σ⊗nC − log τ¯AnCn))− tr(τ¯Cn(log σ⊗nC − log τ¯Cn)) (101)
≥ tr(τ¯AnCn(IA ⊗ log σ⊗nC − log τ¯AnCn)) (102)
≥ tr(τ¯AnCn(IA ⊗ log σ⊗nC − log(IA ⊗ ρE)⊗n − logλ− log
1
p¯
)) (103)
≥ tr(τ¯AnCn(− logλ− log 1
p¯
)) (104)
≥ H(An|Cn)ρ − 8
√
n log
2
ǫ2
− log 2
p
(105)
As stated previously that ρABC is a purification of ρAB, which implies H(A|C) = −H(A|B), we have the inequations
−H(An|Bn)τ¯ ≥ −H(An|Bn)ρ − 8
√
n log
2
ǫ2
− log 2
p
, (106)
H(An|Bn)ρ ≥ H(An|Bn)τ¯ − 8
√
n log
2
ǫ2
− log 2
p
. (107)
Based on Theorem 1 in Ref.[17], we have
H(An|Bn)τ¯ ≥ H(An|Bn)τ − T log(d− 1)−H((T, 1− T )) (108)
≥ H(An|Bn)τ − 4 ǫ
p
+
ǫ
p
log
ǫ
p
+ (1− ǫ
p
) log(1− ǫ
p
) (109)
≥ H(An|Bn)τ − 4 ǫ
p
(110)
where the last inequality holds because of 0 < ǫp < 1. Combining with Eq.(107), it becomes
H(An|Bn)ρ ≥ H(An|Bn)τ − 4 ǫ
p
− 8
√
n log
2
ǫ2
− log 2
p
. (111)
According to Eq. (96), we obtain
Hǫmin(A
n|Bn)τ ≥ H(An|Bn)τ −∆AEP , (112)
with ∆AEP =
√
n(16 + log 2ǫ2sm
+ 8
√
log 2ǫ2sm
) + 4 ǫsmp + log
2
p2 .
In the DM-CVQKD protocol, the above-mentioned random variables are subject to the independent and identical
distribution and have the same probability falling to the four different quadrants. Unfortunately, the practical entropy
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H(U) = −∑4i=1 pi log pi may be less than that of the ideal one for the finite case. In what follows, we give the lower
bound of the practical entropy. Let the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of H(U) be
HˆMLE(U) := −
4∑
i=1
pˆi log pˆi, (113)
where pi is the probability of data falling into the ith quadrant. Then HˆMLE(U) is negatively biased everywhere
EpHˆMLE(U) ≤ H(U). (114)
where Ep denotes the conditional expectation for the given p. The empiric is bounded on H(U) but can not be
observed in experiments. According to the derived bound in Theorem (Antos and Kontoyiannis, 2001) [18],
Pr[|HˆMLE − EHˆMLE| ≥ ǫ] ≤ 2 exp (−nǫ2/2 log22 n), (115)
where n is the number of point that the distribution concentrates on, we obtain a lower bound of Hˆ(U) due to the
measurable HˆMLE. Namely, we have
nHˆ(U) ≥ nHˆMLE −∆n logn
√
2 log
2
ǫent
, (116)
which holds with a probability of at least 1− ǫ. In the two-state DM-CVQKD protocol, n equals to 2 and it becomes
4 in the four-state DM-CVQKD protocol in a similar manner.
V. GAUSSIAN DE FINETTI REDUCTION
Alice prepares one of four coherent states that are described in the Hilbert space. Let HA and HB be two Hilbert
spaces of dimension n, constituting the 4n-dimensional Hilbert space H2,2,n := HA ⊕ HB ⊕ H ′A ⊕ H ′B ∼= C4n. The
Fock space F2,2,n associated with H2,2,n is the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space
F2,2,n :=
∞⊕
k=1
Symk(H2,2,n), (117)
where Symk stands for the symmetric part of H⊗k.
Performing any unitary u ∈ U(n) on these variables, we have
zi → uzi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, and z′j → u¯z′j, ∀j ∈ {1, 2}, (118)
where u¯ denotes the complex conjugate of the unitary matrix u. The switch between Segal-Bargmann representation
and representation in terms of annihilation and creation operators can be expressed as
zk,1 ↔ a†k, zk,2 ↔ b′†k , z′k,1 ↔ b†k, z′k,2 ↔ a′†k . (119)
For the convenience of characterizing the coherent states, we take the four operators Z11, Z12, Z21, Z22 as follows
Z11 =
∞∑
k=1
zk,1z
′
k,1, Z12 =
∞∑
k=1
zk,1z
′
k,2, Z21 =
∞∑
k=1
zk,2z
′
k,1, Z22 =
∞∑
k=2
zk,1z
′
k,2. (120)
Definition 2. (Symmetric subspace). For an integer n ≥ 1, the symmetric subspace FU(n)2,2,n is the subspace of functions
ψ ∈ F2,2,n such that
Wuψ = ψ, (121)
with ∀u ∈ U(n).
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The definition of ψ can be found in Ref.[19]. The domain of the factor space is given by
D := {Λ ∈M2(C) : Ip − ΛΛ† ≥ 0}, (122)
and the cut-off versions Dη is given by
Dη := {Λ ∈M2(C) : ηIp − ΛΛ† ≥ 0}, (123)
for η ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3. (Generalized coherent states). For n ≥ 1, the coherent state ψΛ,n with Λ ∈ D is given by
ψΛ,n = (Z1,1, · · · , Z2,2) = det(1− ΛΛ†)n/2 det exp(ΛTZ), (124)
where Z is the 2× 2 matrix [Zi,j ]i,j∈{1,2}.
Subsequently, we show the modified protocol from an initial protocol E0 known to be secure against Gaussian
collective attacks, by prepending an energy test and an additional privacy amplification test. The CPTP map, which
is the CVQKD protocol, transforming the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space (HA⊗HB)⊗n to the sets of pairs (SA, SB)
of l-bit strings and C, a transcript of the classical communication. A method to characterize a given CPTP map E is
to compare it to an idealized CPTP map F , which can be generated by concatenating the protocol E with a map S
transforming (SA, SB) to two strings of perfect key, that is F = S ◦ E . An operational way of quantifying the security
is to bound the diamond distance between the two maps [12]
‖E − F‖⋄ := sup
ρABE
‖(E − F)⊗ idK(ρABE)‖1, (125)
where the supremum is taken over density operators on (HA ⊗HB)⊗n ⊗ K for any auxiliary system K.
We will give a reduction of the security against general attacks to that against Gaussian collective attacks, for which
security has already been proved in previous sections. Let us suppose that the DM-CVQKD protocol, E0, is secure
against Gaussian collective attacks. In order to ensure the success of reduction, we perform an energy test, T , a CP
map taking a state in a slightly larger Hilbert space, (HA ⊗ HB)⊗(n+k), applying a random unitary u ∈ U(n + k),
measuring the last k modes and comparing the outcome to a threshold fixed in advance. The test is passed if the
measurement result is less than the threshold, and then the global state is restricted to state with low energy. We
apply another CP map P which projects a state on F1,1,n = (HA ⊗HB)⊗n to a low-dimensional Hilbert space F≤K1,1,n
with less than K photons overall in the 2n modes shared by Alice and Bob.
Let E0 be a CVQKD protocol, which is ǫ-secure against Gaussian collective attacks [6], i.e.,
‖((E0 −F0)⊗ I)(|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|)‖1 ≤ ǫ, (126)
where |Λ, n〉 is the generalized coherent state and F0 := S ◦ E0 is a ideal version under Gaussian collective attacks.
We have the following definitions
T : B(F1,1,n+k)→ B(F1,1,n)⊗ {passes/aborts}, (127)
P : B(F1,1,n)→ B(F≤K1,1,n), (128)
R : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l′ × {0, 1}l′. (129)
T is an energy test that applies the Haar measurement on U(n+ k), measure the last k modes of A and B, and check
whether the measurement outputs pass the tests. The measurement results pass the test if Alice’s measurement result
α1, · · · , αn and Bob’s measurement result β1, · · · , βk satisfy the constraints Σni=1|αi|2 ≤ ndA and Σki=1|βi|2 ≤ kdB.
The first n modes will be kept if they pass the test, and will be aborted otherwise. P is a dimension reduction
that maps state ρ ∈ B(F1,1,n) to Π≤kρΠ≤k ∈ B(F≤K1,1,n). It ensures the state in protocol E0 in a finite-dimensional
subspace. R is a privacy amplification procedure that inputs two l-bit strings and outputs l′-bit strings.
Finally, we obtain the DM-CVQKD protocol as follows
E = R ◦ E0 ◦ T . (130)
For the security analysis of the protocol E against arbitrary attacks, one needs to bound ‖E − F‖⋄. Therefore, we
have to show the finite energy version of de Finetti theorem[3]. In the CVQKD protocol, these states are prepared in
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. We give a dimension reduction while the energy is bounded. For the dimension of
F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n , we follow the results derived in Ref. [3], which gives dimF
U(n),≤K
2,2,n =
(
K+4
4
)
.
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Lemma 6. For n ≥ 5 and η ∈ [0, 1], if K ≤ η1−η (n− 5), then the following operator inequality holds∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dνµn(Λ) ≥ (1− ε)Π≤K (131)
with Π≤K :=
∑K
k=0 Π=k, ε ≤ 2(N+K)
7
N3 exp(− 2N
3
(N+K)2 ln 2 ) and N = n− 5.
Theorem 7. For K ≥ n1−η , it holds that
T (n, η) := tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≤ K
4
12
. (132)
Proof. The trace of the volume on Dη is given by
tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) =
∫ η
0
∫ η
0
q(x, y)dxdy (133)
=
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
2
∫ η
0
∫ η
0
(x− y)2
(1− x)4(1− y)4 dxdy (134)
=
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
12(1− η)4 (135)
≤ n
4
12(1− η)4 (136)
=
K4
12
. (137)
The last equation is achieved with K = n1−η .
To bound the diamond distance of ‖E − F‖⋄ [3], it can be described as
‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ‖E˜ ◦ T − F˜ ◦ T ‖⋄ + ‖E − E˜ ◦ T ‖⋄ + ‖F − F˜ ◦ T ‖⋄ (138)
≤ ‖(E˜ − F˜) ◦ T ‖⋄ + ‖R ◦ E0(id− P) ◦ T ‖⋄ + ‖S ◦ R ◦ E0 ◦ (id− P)T ‖⋄ (139)
≤ ‖E˜ − F˜‖⋄ + 2‖(id− P ) ◦ T ‖⋄ (140)
where E˜ = R ◦ E0 ◦ P and F˜ = S ◦ E˜ . We note the CP maps T , S, R and E0 would not increase the diamond norm.
Taking E˜ = E ◦ P with P being the trace non-increasing CP map, the diamond norm becomes
‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ‖E − F‖⋄ + 2‖(I− P ) ◦ T ‖⋄. (141)
For the first part on the right of the inequality, we bound the diamond distance as follows.
Theorem 8. If E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then
‖E − F‖⋄ = ‖R ◦ (E0 −F0) ◦ P≤K‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)ε. (142)
where T (n, η) = (n−1)(n−2)
2(n−3)
12(1−η)4 and E = R ◦ E0 ◦ P≤K.
Proof. To restrict ε in Lemma 6 less than 12 , for α =
K
N , we have a map N
∗ := [1,∞]→ N such that
N∗(α) = max {38,min{N ∈ N : 2(1 + α)7N4 exp (− 2N
(1 + α)2 ln 2
) ≤ 1
2
}}. (143)
We also define the positive operator
Pη :=
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dνn(Λ), (144)
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where dνn(Λ) =
(n−1)(n−2)2(n−3)
π4 det(I2−ΛΛ†)4 dλ11dλ12dλ21dλ22. Let τ
η
H be the normalized state of the projector Pη given by
τηH = tr(Pη)Pη. (145)
We obtain |Φη〉 = (√τηH ⊗ I)|Φ〉, a purification of τηH, where |Φ〉 can be expressed by the orthonormal basis of FU(n)2,2,n ,
|Φ〉HN =
∑
i |νi〉H〈νi|N . Assume ρ is an arbitrary density operator on FU(n),≤K2,2,n and M = pτ−1/2ρτ−1/2 is non
negative operator. After performing the measurement M = {M, I−M} on state Φη, we obtain
τηH = trN (|Φη〉〈Φη|HN )
= trN ((1⊗M1/2)|Φη〉〈Φη|(1⊗M1/2))
= tr((τ1/2 ⊗M1/2)
∑
i,j
|νi〉〈νj | ⊗ |νi〉〈νj |(τ1/2 ⊗M1/2))
= τ1/2pτ−1/2ρτ−1/2τ1/2
= pρ.
Then we have
ρHN = 2T (n, η) · τHN . (146)
where p = 12T (n,η) . The hypothesis that protocol E0 is ǫ-secure against collective attacks in Eq. (126) implies
‖((E0 −F0)⊗ I)(|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|)‖1 ≤ ǫ (147)
Let ∆ be a linear map from End(F≤K1,1,n) to End(H′). Particularly, ∆ may be the difference between the CPTP
maps E and F , where End(L) denotes the space of all endomorphisms on L. The linear CPTP map Kπ such that
∆ ◦ π = Kπ ◦∆ reduces the diamond distance to the linear norm [6]
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)‖(∆⊗ id)τηHN ‖1. (148)
Finally, we have
‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)‖((E − F)⊗ id)τηHN ‖1
= 2T (n, η)‖(R◦ (E0 −F0) ◦ P≤K ⊗ id)τηHN ‖1
≤ 2T (n, η)‖((E0 −F0) ◦ P≤K ⊗ id)τηH‖1
= 2T (n, η)‖((E0 −F0)⊗ id)(T (n, η)−1
∫
D
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dνn(Λ))‖1
≤ 2ǫ‖
∫
D
dνn(Λ)‖1
= 2T (n, η)ǫ,
(149)
which completes the proof of this theorem.
Moreover, the diamond norm of second part on the right of the inequality of Eq. (141) can be restricted to be
ε-small.
Lemma 9. For any dA, dB ≥ 0 and integer K ≤ n(dA + dB), owing to Udn ≤ 2T dn , we have
IH⊗nA ⊗H⊗nB − P
≤K ≤ 2T dAn ⊗ IH⊗nB + 2IH⊗nA ⊗ T
dB
n . (150)
Theorem 10. Let ρ be a rotationally invariant state on H⊗(n+k). For any d ≥ 0, we have
tr[(T d
′
n ⊗ (I− T dk ))ρ] ≤ ε (151)
where d′ = g(n, k, ε)d with g(n, k, ε) =
1+2
√
ln(2/ε)
n +
2 ln(2/ε)
n
1−2
√
ln(2/ε)
k
.
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Proof. Based on the definition of T dn :=
1
πn
∫
Σni=1|αi|2≥nd |α1〉〈α1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αn〉〈αn|dα1 · · ·αn, tr[T
d
nρ] is the probability
of applying measurement on n modes of ρ with outcomes satisfying Σki=1|αi|2 ≥ nd. In the DM-CVQKD protocol,
the prepared coherent states are |αei(2k+1)π/4〉 and we take αi =
√
x2i + p
2
i for the security analysis. In the energy
test, n + k modes of state ρ are measured with outcomes α1, · · · , αn+k, where the first n modes will be kept if the
last k modes meet the constraint Σki=1|αi|2 ≤ nd. Tr[((T d
′
n ⊗ (1 − T dk ))ρ] is the probability that the energy test does
not work with
Yn := Σ
n
i=1|αi|2 ≥ nd′ and Yk := Σki=1|αn+i|2 ≤ kd. (152)
Then tr[(T d
′
n ⊗ (I− T dk ))ρ] can be expressed as
tr[(T d
′
n ⊗ (I− T dk ))ρ] = Pr[(Yn ≥ nd′) ∧ (Yk ≤ kd)] (153)
≤ Pr[kdYn ≥ nd′Yk] (154)
where the last inequality holds because the parameters are all positive. Because the amplitude α is subject to
Gaussian distribution with variance Vα, Yn/Vα and Yk/Vα both obey the χ
2 distribution with Yn/Vα ∼ χ
2(n) and
Yk/Vα ∼ χ
2(k). Consequently, we obtain the probability
Pr[kdYn ≥ nd′Yk] = Pr[kdYn/Vα ≥ nd′Yk/Vα] (155)
≤ Pr[Yn/Vα ≥ tnd′] + Pr[Yk/Vα ≤ tkd], (156)
where t is chosen such that tkd = k − 2
√
k ln 2ε . According to Lemma.1, the parameter d
′ is chosen to meet the
constraints
Pr[Yn/Vα ≥ tnd′] ≤ ε
2
, Pr[Yk/Vα ≤ tkd] ≤ ε
2
. (157)
Therefore, we obtains
d′ =
1 + 2
√
ln(2/ε)
n +
2 ln(2/ε)
n
1− 2
√
ln(2/ε)
k
d, (158)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 11. For integers n, k, dA, dB ≥ 1, taking K = n(d′A + d′B) for dA/B := g(n, k, ε/4)dA/B, we have
‖(I− P(n,K)) ◦ T (k, dA, dB)‖⋄ ≤ ε (159)
Proof.
‖(I− P) ◦ T ‖⋄ = max
ρ∈H⊗2(n+k)AB
‖(((I− P) ◦ T )⊗ I
H
⊗(n+k)
AB
)(ρ)‖1 (160)
≤ max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)AB ))
‖(I− P≤K) ◦ T ‖1 (161)
≤ max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)AB ))
‖(Ud′An ⊗ I+ I⊗ Ud
′
B
n ) ◦ ((I− T dAk )⊗ (T dBk − I))(ρ)‖ (162)
≤ max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)A ))
‖(Ud′An ◦ I− T dAk )(ρ)‖1 + max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)B ))
‖(Ud′Bn ◦ (I− T dBk ))(ρ)‖ (163)
≤ 2 max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)A ))
‖(T d′An ◦ (I− T dAk ))(ρ)‖1 + 2 max
ρ∈Inv(S(H⊗(n+k)B ))
‖(T d′Bn ◦ (I− T dBk ))(ρ)‖1 (164)
≤ ε (165)
Theorem 12. If the protocol E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then the protocol E = R ◦ E0 ◦ P is
ε′-secure against general attacks with
ε′ ≤ K
4
6
ε+ 2ε. (166)
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